20th October 2021

███████████

Editorial Legal Director

Hachette UK Limited

Carmelite House
50 Victoria Embankment
London EC4Y 0DZ

Dear ███████

Re: Julian Hayes – ‘Stonehouse Cabinet Minister, Fraudster, Spy’

Does Hayes even believe Stonehouse was a “Spy”?

On Page 15 of Hayes’ book he writes: “The message showed clearly how Stonehouse was about to be unwittingly ensnared. He became pressured into under-taking two specific courses of action on behalf of his new associates. The first related to a parliamentary debate regarding the conditions that the Western allies had insisted on before relations could be developed with Czechoslovakia, one of which was the insistence that Soviet troops should leave the country. Stonehouse agreed to challenge this in the parliamentary debate, but the opportunity failed to arise. The second concerned the British government’s refusal to allow a Czech trade delegation to travel to Rhodesia, which Stonehouse was able to challenge, pleasing Kugler immensely.”

So you can compare this paragraph with the source material, I reproduce below a translation of the relevant section in StB document 43075_43075_000_0121, which is a pre-recruitment document, undated but between August and November 1959:

KOLON:

Current status:

Comrade Kugler has been in contact with KOLON since November 1957; the plan called for using KOLON for active measures in parliament. So far, two attempts have been made to use KOLON along these lines:

• In October 1958 there was discussion with KOLON about an active measure in the question of removing the demand for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia from the Labour Party platform. This measure was presented in an unconscious form; KOLON promised to speak on this matter in the parliamentary Labour Party. He did not keep his promise on the grounds that debate was limited to questions of domestic policy.
• An active measure in the matter of the refusal by the British authorities of a trip by our trade delegation to Rhodesia. KOLON promised to intervene in the matter to the colonial ministry. This measure was carried out.

As you can see, there are differences between Hayes’ account of this document and the contents of the document itself – which itself should not be taken seriously as it was written by spies trying to impress their masters in Prague and keep their jobs, not to mention their lives and that of their families.

In his book Hayes has the narrative that “He became pressured into under-taking two specific courses of action on behalf of his new associates.” However, as you can clearly see from my highlight the supposed discussion about the withdrawal of Soviet troops took place in October 1958 – a year earlier. Hayes can see that as clearly as you or I, but he likes the narrative that there was “pressure”. One has to ask, how can a man “became pressured into under-taking” a role that had already taken place – so they say – a year earlier? 

Hayes has exaggerated where this was supposed to have taken place. The StB document says quite clearly “in the parliamentary labour party” but in Hayes’ hand that becomes “The first related to a parliamentary debate” and “Stonehouse agreed to challenge this in the parliamentary debate”. But there is no confusion about this because there is also in the file a 3/11/58 report by agent Hanousek (43075_43075_000_0097) which says my father will raise the issue with a group of Labour parliamentarians on 6/11/58.  

I think one should be able to expect a source document to be represented faithfully and not spun to suit the author’s narrative. I also think an author should make some effort to research and be able to confirm or deny statements made by people who were professional liars. Hayes writes that “The second concerned the British government’s refusal to allow a Czech trade delegation to travel to Rhodesia, which Stonehouse was able to challenge, pleasing Kugler immensely” but where is his evidence, first that my father was involved in this “challenge”, second, that a delegation took place, and third, that Kugler was pleased “immensely”?

Hayes has had to scrape the bottom of the StB-file barrel to gather any material that he can spin into a yarn that my father was “pressured” into working for them. He knows perfectly well that the evidence is not there and instead the file is chock full of the StB reporting on their failure to secure him as an agent. For example, see the full quotes on the following pages. We start with this quote above on page 15, in which the StB agents say “he did not keep his promise” or, as Julian puts it:

Page 15: “the opportunity failed to arise”

Page 29: “the information Stonehouse was imparting was limited”

Page 29: “clearly he did not always jump to the tune of his superiors”

Page 30: “a move that did not please his Prague paymasters”

Pages 37-8: “They had lost contact in 1963 and despite repeated attempts to reconnect with him, Stonehouse had apparently shunned them”

Page 39: “Stonehouse continued to remain as elusive as ever, much to Husak’s frustration: ‘I have been calling him … either his wife takes the phone or no one gets it’.”

Page 39: “The Czech’s hopes of re-engaging Stonehouse had been proving fruitless”

Page 39: “the minister continued to avoid them”

Page 41: “At the end of September 1965, Husak attended the Labour Party conference in Blackpool with the intention of initiating further contact with Stonehouse but it proved a frustrating pursuit. Despite regularly glimpsing the minister from the balcony or across the crowded lobby, he could never get close enough to speak to him”

Page 43: “If the StB thought this would encourage further cooperation they were sadly mistaken”

Page 44: “Husak complained that Stonehouse would not be drawn into divulging any information in the conversations. The wily minister resorted to providing the intelligence in writing, invariably, when they were travelling in a cab or car. He would afford Husak the opportunity to read his handwritten notes but refused to allow the Czech to take them away with him. Stonehouse was ever conscious that such notes would be fatal were they to be discovered. The nature of the intelligence he provided was disappointing. One of Husak’s cyphers expressed their growing dismay, commenting that it could easily be obtained from the newspapers.”

Page 45: “The minister did not allow Husak to retain the handwritten notes”

Page 45: “’These reports you supply have a very limited life span and value to us’ complained the Czech … ‘Given your position, you should be supplying us with better information’.”

Page 46: “he considered it was now only possible to give oral reports”

Page 46: (Re “new alloy”) “he slipped it back into the safety of his pocket”

Page 47: “highlighting their concerns that they were not getting intelligence of any quality from the minister. Add to that his evasiveness …”

Page 47: “Husak continued to point out that the information Stonehouse provided was of limited value and was easily obtained through other sources.”

Page 48: “Husak did not want to continue with Stonehouse’s scribbled notes, all of which the minister retained.”

Page 48: (Re covert recording) “Unfortunately the noise in the restaurant put paid to any meaningful recording”

Page 48: (Husak): “… K [codename Kolon] is an old twister and that there will be some more work to do” 

Page 48: “Plans were made to introduce Stonehouse to his new contact, Karel Pravec, codename Pelnar, but it proved problematic as a combination of the politician’s work commitments as well as a loss of appetite for the games that he had been playing meant that no such meeting could be arranged.”

Page 51: “The Czechs objected to Stonehouse’s use of oral accounts”

Page 52: “If the Czechoslovaks thought they had resolved their problem they were again to be sadly mistaken. They continued to experience problems with Stonehouse’s ‘cooperation’.”

Page 52: “nor would he convene meetings over the telephone as the calls were likely to be under surveillance.”

Page 52: “To the Czechoslovaks continued irritation Stonehouse did not live up to his promise”

Page 52: “They were not getting value for money and were considering other ways of trying to compromise him”

Page 74: “Stonehouse had failed to attend any further meetings … but again he was thwarted by Stonehouse”

Page 74: “That meeting did not take place”

Page 74: “Pravec attempted to contact Stonehouse at his apartment. He later reported that he had called on no less than twenty occasions, leaving messages with his wife to return his calls.”

Page 74: “he had given away nothing of any significance”

Page 81: “the Czechs had received scant return on their investment”

Page 81: “Pravec undertook a comprehensive evaluation, submitting a report to his superiors in Prague on 20 January 1970 describing in detail how Stonehouse had gone to considerable lengths to evade their advances and listing the numerous attempts they had made to re-engage with him, to no avail.”

Page 81: (Re. photos) “Pravec conceded that on their own the photos would now have little impact”

Page 81: (Re. recording) “… but the quality was poor. While Husak could be heard making comments that had the potential to compromise the minister, Stonehouse’s responses were obscured”

Page 82: "Notably absent from the report was any reference to any record or film of the fabled ‘honey trap’ which supposedly took place during his visit to Czechoslovakia in 1957, begging the question as to whether any such event ever occurred.”

Page 82 (Quote from file): “Given that the use of compromising material against him is questionable, I suggest that the Twister file be permanently stored in the … archive” 

Page 353: “There does not appear to be any evidence of a honey trap, if there had been, it is certain that the StB would have relied upon it to ‘compromise’ their man when he wasn’t cooperative. They didn’t, strongly suggesting they never had it in the first place.”

Page 353: “He hadn’t provided the Czechs with anything significant and the disappointment in their filed reports is palpable.”

Page 354: “That information, however, could easily have been obtained through other means.”

Page 354: “… the prosecution would not even be able to establish that payments were ever received by Stonehouse.” 

These quotes are interspersed with Hayes’ usual narrative, for which there is never any evidence. For example, on page 48 he writes “Naturally the politician did not want anything he supplied to be traced to him. A compromise was reached: any document would be typed anonymously using an uppercase font”. What Hayes does not say here is that there is no document in the StB file in that format. Instead, he sticks with his story and continues “Stonehouse continued to provide intelligence …” yet Hayes has to admit “… but the Czechs remained dissatisfied.”

Of course Hayes has not detailed all the disappointments experienced by the Czechs. My personal favourite is from February 1963 when the words ‘he did not show enough initiative’ were underlined twice with three exclamation marks added to the side. As Hayes says “the disappointment in their filed reports is palpable.” However, it is not enough, apparently, for Hayes to question whether my father was actually a spy. Rather, he blasts the word “SPY” over the cover of his book. The question is, does he believe it? When he emailed me on 23 July 2019, he wrote about the “████████” – “██████████  ████████ ███████.” [Redaction: see below]

If Hayes is now so convinced my father was a spy, then why is it necessary for him to ‘doctor’ the source material, and why is it so difficult for him to produce the evidence?

Yours sincerely,

Julia Stonehouse

Redacted for copyright reasons.

Hayes says he doubts that my father was a spy.